EVT vs EVTX
Windows XP is no longer supported by Microsoft, but there are still XP
and 2003 systems out there, and as such, some of us are still going to
need to know the difference between Event Logs (XP, 2003), and Windows
Event Logs (Vista+).
Besides the binary differences in the records and Event Log files
themselves, on XP/2003, there were three main Event Log files; System,
Application, and Security. On my Windows 7 system, a 'dir' of the winevt\Logs folder reports 143 files. So, there is a LOT
of information being recorded by default on a Windows 7 system; while
not all of it may be useful to you, there is a great deal of information
that can be extracted from the logs when used properly.
Wevtx.bat
When I released Windows Forensic Toolkit 4/e, one of the things included in the additional materials is a batch file, wevtx.bat. What the batch file does is use LogParser to parse a directory full of .evtx files, and then parse those entries into TLN format for inclusion in a timeline. The tool evtxparse.exe,
used by the batch file, makes use of a mapping file (i.e.,
eventmap.txt) to map event source/ID pairs to an artifact category tag.
As such, when the entry in written to a timeline, records such as
"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/4624" are prepended with an
appropriate tag (i.e., "[Logon]"), based on the artifact category.
I really love this tool! What I like about it is that it's easy to
update (eventmap.txt is just a text file), I can add comments to it to
show the source of the information I used to map an event record to
something specific, and it acts as a fantastic little repository for all
of my past experiences. Not only is it a great repository, but it's
incorporated right into the tools that I use on just about every
engagement.
Records
Here are some of the event source/ID pairs that I've found to be useful
during investigations, for such things as malware detection, determining
the window of compromise, etc. I'll say up front that these
records are not 100% infallible, and may not have extremely high
fidelity (some do, others don't...), but they've worked quite well for
me at one time or another, so I'll share them here.
Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/1014
– DNS name resolution timeout; I've used this one more than once to
help demonstrate that malware was on a system, even in the face of
anti-forensics techniques (time stomping the malware files, deleting the
malware files, etc.). It's not a 100%, infallible indicator, but it's
worked for me more than once. What has also helped is when this
event record was seen; in a timeline, I could see that it occurred
shortly after a user logged into a laptop, and before the user connected
the system to a WAP. This helped me narrow down the persistence
mechanism for the malware.
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/4720 - user account created; because the bad guys do this from time to time.
McLogEvent/257 – McAfee malware detection - McAfee AV may detect
malware behaviors (i.e., run from a Temp folder, etc.) without actually
detecting the EXE itself. This can be very valuable in helping you
determine how malware got onto a system. Also, the AV product may be
configured to warn only, and take no action..so, correlate the event
records (UTC) to the entries in the McAfee logs (local system time)
Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/3004 – Windows Defender malware detection
Service Control Manager/7045 – A service was installed on the system
Service Control Manager/7030 – A service is configured to interact with the desktop
Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/106 - New Scheduled Task registration
Beyond individual event records (source/ID pairs), one of the aspects of
the newer versions of Windows (in particular, Windows 7) is that there
are a lot of events that are being recorded by default, across multiple
Event Log files. What I mean is that when some events occur, multiple
event records are recorded, often across different Event Log files. For
example, when a user logs into a system at the console, there will be
an event recorded in the Security Event Log, a couple in the Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational.evtx log, and a couple of events will also be recorded in the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational.evtx
log. Alone, each of these individual events may get little attention
from an analyst, but when placed together in a timeline, they leave an
indelible mark indicating that a user logged into the system.
Now, what's really great about this is that some of the Event Logs "roll
over" faster than others. As such, some of the source/ID pairs that
are part of an indicator cluster may have been expired from their
respective Event Logs. However, the remaining source/ID pairs in the
cluster will still provide a very good indicator that that event in
question took place. This is particular useful for infrequent events,
and I've used this information more than once to demonstrate repeated
activity going back weeks and even months prior to what was thought to
be the date of interest.
Anti-Forensics
Event auditing is one of those things that just happens in the
background on Windows systems. This is great, because sometimes Event
Log records can help us determine if anti-forensics techniques have been
employed. For example, using Event Log records, you can determine if
someone has changed the system time.
During an exam, I found that a system had been infected with malware
that installed as a Windows service, and during the installation
process, the .exe file had been time-stomped. Fortunately, when the
malicious service was installed, an event source/ID pair of "Service Control Manager/7045"
was created, indicating that a new service had been installed on the
system. I was able to correlate that information with other sources
(MFT, etc.) to better determine the correct time of when the malicious
.exe was created on the system, and nail down the infection vector.
Carving
If you need to carve Windows Event Log records, for any reason...from
unallocated space, memory, the pagefile, whatever...the tool to use is
Willi Ballentin's EVTXtract.
The "tool" is really a set of Python scripts that you run consecutively
against the data in order to recover Windows Event Log records. I've
used these scripts a couple of times, and even had a fellow team member
use them on an engagement and quite literally recover the "smoking gun".
When carving for deleted records on a Windows XP or 2003 system, I use a
custom Perl script that I wrote that's based on some of the code I've
released with my books.
Timelines
When all this is said and done, a blog post on just individual Windows Event Log records isn't really
all that valuable. Yes, I've created timelines from just a handful of
*.evtx files, for use in triage, etc. This has proved to be extremely
valuable to me.
Resources
WindowsIR: Timeline Analysis
SANS Reading Room: Detecting Security Events Using Windows Workstation Event Logs
NSA: Spotting the Adversary with Windows Event Log Monitoring
Fuente: http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2014/10/windows-event-logs.html
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